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OF JUDICIAL FREEDOM AND JUDICIAL 
CONSTRAINT: THE VOICE OF LOUISIANA'S 
JUDGE ALBERT TATE, JR.* 
PAUL R. BAIERt 
I think it a noble and pious thing to do whatever we may by 
written word and molded bronze and sculptured stone to keep 
our memories, our reverence, and our love alive and to hand 
them on to new generations all too ready to forget. 1 
* Address delivered at the Albert Tate, Jr. Seminar: Bridging Acade­
mia, The Bench & The Bar, Commemorating The Distinguished Life and Career 
of Albert Tate, Jr., May 9, 1987, Louis J. Roussell Auditorium, Loyola University, 
New Orleans. Thanks to Christopher J. Roy, Sr., first Chair of the Bill of Rights 
Section, Louisiana State Bar Association, for envisioning the Seminar in memory 
of Judge Tate, to Governor Edwin Edwards, Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr., 
Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, Clare Tate, the Tate family, and the host of 
judges and lawyers who participated, and to Chancellor B. K Agnihotri and 
Southern University Law Center for co-sponsoring the Seminar. After twenty 
years, we renew our memories, our reverence, our love and hand them on to new 
generations eager to learn from the past. 
Editors' Note: The Board of Editors of the Southern University Law Review is 
pleased to publish Professor Baier's memorial portrait of Judge Albert Tate, Jr., 
who was a great friend of Southern University Law Center, its Faculty and stu­
dent body, and a notable contributor to the history-making first volume of our 
Law Review-his brilliant expose, The Justice Function of the Judge, 1 S.U. L. 
REV. 250 (1975). We thank Professor Baier for favoring us with his address, 
which he has annotated for publication here. As a new generation, we are hon­
ored to remember, not to forget, Judge Tate in this way. We also thank T he  
Times-Picayune fo r  its financial support to the Law Review and for its courtesy in 
providing the photographic frontispiece, the same image projected on to the stage 
at the conclusion of Professor Baier's speech. It vividly evokes memory of its 
amazing subject. 
t George M. Armstrong, Jr. Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center, Louisiana State University. Member of the Louisiana Bar. Judicial Fel­
low, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-76; Executive Director, Louisiana 
Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 1987-1991; 
Scholar in Residence, Louisiana Bar Foundation, 1990-92; Distinguished Profes­
sor, Louisiana Bar Foundation, 2004. Editor, MR. JUSTICE AND MRs. BLACK: THE 
M�:MOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK (Random House, 1986); LIONS 
UNDER THE THRONE: THE EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE LECTURES OF CIIlEF JUSTICES 
WARREN E. BURGER AND WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST (La. Bar Found., 1995). Vice­
Chairman, Bill of Rights Section, Louisiana State Bar Association. Secretary, 
Supreme Court of Louisiana Historical Society. 
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., lpswitch, At the Unveiling of Memorial 
Tablets (July 31, 1902), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES 136 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962). 
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The other day I reached for a volume of the Federal Re­
porter, 2d Series, in search of some point or other of the law-I 
forget which. My eye caught the name of Albert Tate, Jr., on the 
spine of the report.2 We are all familiar with the countless num­
ber of judicial memorials, published in endless volumes of reports 
that line the walls where we work. 3 
The sight of Judge Tate's name in gold letters draped in 
black made me wince at the thought of dying young with so much 
energy wasted away. We all know the disbelief of losing Judge 
Tate, especially Claire, his companion in life. Their home on Oc­
tavia Street is empty without him. It seems only yesterday that 
his exuberance for life and his big smile filled our hearts with joy. 
Al Tate was extraordinary.4 His human spirit enveloped all 
who knew him with love.5 His voice was galvanic. 
2. In Memoriam, Honorable Albert Tate, Jr., 798 F.2d XCI (1986). 
Born Opelousas, Louisiana, September 23, 1920. LL.B. 194 7, Yale Law School. 
Certificate in Civil Code Studies, Louisiana State University Law School, 1948. 
Married Claire Jenmard, of Ville Platte, 1949. Country lawyer, with L. 0. Fusil­
ier, Ville Platte, 1948-54. Elected, Louisiana Court of Appeal First Circuit, 
1954; Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal Third Circuit, 1960-70. 
Elected, Louisiana Supreme Court, 1970-79. Delegate, Louisiana Constit utional 
Convention of 1973; Chair, Committee on Style. Sworn in, upon President 
Carter's commission, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No­
vember 2, 1979. Died March 27, 1986; survived by Claire and five children, 
Albert III (Father Jules), Emma Adelaide, George J., Michael F., and Charles E. 
3. Such memorials, Judge Tate poignantly recognized, manifest an 
e ternal ideal of justice: 
And so today we reverence not only our departed friends, but 
through them the judicial power they exercised in the name of 
all the American people, present, past, and future. In ceremo­
nies such as these, in time beyond our contemplation, the 
members of the legal profession will gather to pay their re­
spects to the eternal ideal of justice, and both we and those 
who have already departed will in communion with them in 
those solemn moments render our silent account to our God of 
our joint stewardship of the heritage of American justice. 
Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the Judge in the American Republic, 16 LA. L. Ri-:v. 
386, 390 (1956). 
4. Judge Tate's colleague on the Louisiana Supreme Court, his good 
friend Justice James L. Dennis, explains: 
The example of Judge Albert Tate, Jr., as a jurist, writer, 
teacher, colleague, and human continues to sustain us even af-
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I remember seeing him in a small cubicle at New York Uni­
versity where he taught the Appellate Judges Seminar in the 
summer.6 He was surrounded by stacks of books, his green visor 
ter his death. Undoubtedly, his judicial opinions and legal 
commentary constitute the most significant contribution by an 
individual to the jurisprudence of Louisiana. Although only 
his contemporaries could know fully the intensity, the honesty, 
and generosity of his personality, his written works remain as 
a source of strength and inspiration for future generations. 
James L. Dennis, Foreword to REFLECTIONS ON LAW, LAWYERING, & JUDGING: 
THE ESSAYS & ARTICLES OF JUSTICE ALBERT TATE , JR. ix (George W. Pugh, Jr., 
ed., Pugh Inst. for Justice, La. State Univ. Law Ctr., 2006). 
Warren M. Billings, Historian of the Louisiana Supreme Court, cap­
tures Judge Tate's persona precisely in his Confessions of a Court Historian: 
One had only to be in the presence of Judge Tate but a short 
while to recognize him as one of God's rare creatures. A small­
ish, rumpled man, he mingled earthiness with an innate knack 
for friendliness and storytelling that immediately drew one to 
him. Those characteristics belied a formidable mind and a 
broad erudition, to which he joined an acute sense of Louisiana 
history and the place of his profession in it. 
Warren M. Billings, Confessions of a Court Historian, 35 LA. HIST. 261, 262 
( 1994). 
5. "Al was a great leader, and a great teacher." John A Dixon Jr., In 
Memoriam, Honorable Albert Tate Jr., 61 TuL. L. REV. 711, 712 (1987). Chief 
.fuAtice Dixon said of his great friend and colleague: 
But Al Tate's character and personality are what endeared 
him to everyone touched by his life. Judge Tate had a genuine 
love for people-collectively and individually. He knew more 
people by name than anyone I ever saw. He never failed to 
speak to students, law clerks, and other young people. All 
kinds of people came to him with their troubles, and he alway s  
listened. Even up i n  Shreveport people knew Al Tate. A little 
paper up there called the Upstate printed a full page editorial 
about him last week, called The Nicest Genius You Ever Met. 
Id. at 713 (citing Baudouin, The Nicest Genius You Ever Met, Upstate (Shreve­
port. La), April 24, 1986, at 10). "Of all the judges I have known, Al also had the 
lnrgest heart for mankind as well as for each and every human being. He really 
cared." Mack E. Barham, In Memoriam, Albert Tate, Jr. Judge of the Fifth Cir­
ruit Court of Appeals, 1979-1986 Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana, 
1970-1979, 47 LA. L. REV. 921, 921 (1987). 
6. Judge Tate first attended the Seminar as a young appellate judge 
and later became a stalwart member of its teaching faculty and a good friend of 
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jutting out from his forehead. Perhaps you know the image I 
have in mind. And what was he doing while others had escaped 
to Washington Square and beyond? A thousand miles from home, 
he was writing an article on his beloved Acadiana. 7 
I owe much to Judge Tate. Fifteen years ago w hen Piper 
was in the Gerry Carrier he urged me to transplant my family to 
Louisiana soil. Al Tate loved LSU's Law School and he advised 
me to join its faculty. ''You'll have fun," he said. Judge Tate's 
confidence in me helped dispel the moments of self-doubt and dis­
trust that come to us all. His undying example lifts our spirits 
still. 
Now to my academic duty. I am honored to be listed on the 
program as the only professor given leave to speak. I propose to 
prove to you that Louisiana's Judge Albert Tate, Jr., was-first 
Robert A. Leflar, Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas 
and Director of the Appellate Judges Seminar, Institute of Judicial Administra­
tion, New York University. See Albert Tate, Jr. ,  Bob Lefiar's Impact on the Ju 
dicial Process, 25 ARK. L. REV. 95 (1971). 
[T]he ten days or two weeks of discussion with fellow judges, in 
the peaceful atmosphere of a university and away from the 
pressing demands of the docket, offer an exhilarating opportu­
nity to think and talk and read and dream about first things, 
and to come away refreshed with a clearer understanding of 
judicial responsibilities and an eagerness to perform them 
well. 
Id. at 110. By the time of this tribute to Leflar, Justice Tate was on the Loui!li­
ana Supreme Court and Chairman of the Appellate Judges' Conference, Section 
of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association, which was then howwd 
at Louisiana State University Law Center. Judge Tate's eagerness to judge wt>ll 
was bolstered by his enormous energy, his scholarship, his seriousness of pur­
pose, his love of justice and of life. He exemplified Robert Leflar's Iifctinw 
dream of improving the quality of the law through continuing education of tlw 
judiciary. See Robert A. Leflar, The Appellate Judges Seminar at New York 
University, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359 (1956); Robert A. Leflar, The Quality ol 
Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289 (1960). And Judge Tate's exemplar also inspired hi,; 
colleagues. Chief Justice John Dixon said of Al Tate: "'He kindled fires in hi,; 
colleagues that made it possible for them to work hard together in an effort to do 
ju.stic�.'" Mack E. Barham, In Memoriam, Albert Tate, Jr. Judge of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1979-1986 Associate Justice, Supreme Court of L-01iisi 
ana, 1970-1979, 47 LA. L. REV. 921, 921 (1987). 
7. See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Ville Platte in 1870, 30 L\. 
GENEALOGICAL REG. 107 (1983); Albert Tate, Jr, 1860 Census of the Ville Plat fr 
Area, 20 ATIAKAPAS GAZE'ITE 52 (1985). 
2008] OF JUDICIAL FREEDOM 447 
and last-a judge; that however much he desired to render com­
mon sense justice under the facts, "the discipline of his craft," as 
Judge Tate often called it, constrained him from administering 
justice solely on his own idea of what was fair.8 
This is the old theme of judicial freedom and judicial con­
straint. 9 I raise it anew because the question deeply concerned 
Judge Tate, both in his decisions on the bench and in his ageless 
academic writings.10 
8. Albert Tate, jr., The Judge As a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 438, 445 
(1959). "But however much the appellate judge desires to render common sense 
justice under the facts, certain restrictions-the discipline of his craft-inhibit 
him from administering justice solely on his own idea of what is fair." Id. "[O]ur 
legal system requires not only that equity be reached wherever possible in indi­
vidual cases; it also requires some consistency and predictability of result based 
upon past decisions," keeping in mind "the self restraint called for by the tradi­
tion of our judiciary." Id. at 445, 446. In a very rare percentage of cases "the 
individual views of the judges as to what is fair become decisive, due for exam­
ple to the absence or conflict of prior precedents. There, in these very rare 
cases, the court is creatively free to apply the conflicting principles of law ad­
vanced, in such a manner as to produce the result the court itself thinks is most 
fair. " Id. at 446. "[T]he vast mill-run of litigation neither requires nor allows 
much free play of judicial discretion. " Albert Tate, Jr., The Law-Making Func­
tion of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REV. 211, 211 (1968); see also id. at 233 ("courts do 
possess and should exercise law-making responsibilities"; "judicial creativity is 
an essential component of the process of deciding cases"). 
9. See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Book Review, 25 LA. L. REV. 577, 584 
(196 5) (reviewing F'R.AN<;OIS GENY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN 
DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (Jaro Mayda & La. State Law Inst. trans. , W. Publ'g Co. 
1963) (1899); Albert Tate, Jr., The "New" Judicial Solution: Occasions for and 
Limits to Judicial Creativity, 54 TuL. L. REV. 877 (1980) . 
10. Like Benjamin Cardozo before him, The Nature of the Judicial 
Process (1921), and Fran�ois Geny before Cardozo, Methode d'Interpretation et 
Sources en Droit Prive Positif (Paris, 1899), Louisiana's Judge Albert Tate, Jr. 
subjected the judicial process to introspective scrutiny over a lifetime of extraju­
dicial study and scholarship. See, especially, his penetrating review of Jaro 
Mayda's translation of Geny's Methode d'Interpretation et Sources en Droit Prive 
Positif, in which he stated: "For the reviewer, Geny's analysis and suggested 
method was not just an X-ray showing the internal arrangement of the legal 
system; it was more a sort of stethoscope, catching the living beat of the law in 
action." Albert Tate, Jr., Book Review, 25 LA. L. REV. 577, 586 (1965). For other 
of Judge Tate's extrajudicial writings on the judicial process not cited in the 
annotations herein, see Albert Tate, Jr. , "Policy" in Judicial Decisions, 20 LA. L. 
REV. 62 , 67, 75 (1959) ("Policy, in the sense that justice is the aim and intent of 
all legal system and procedures, is the spirit vitalizing the letters of the law"; 
"statutes and precedents are indeed the body of the law, 'policy'-or justice-is 
its soul"); Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44 TUL. L. REV. 
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Only the other day I heard a lawyer who should know bet­
ter say of Judge Tate that he was a perfect example of "the unre­
strained judge." My thesis is just opposite. To be sure, Judge 
Tate often gave voice to the great fundamental aim of the law­
"To see that justice is done"11 -, but time and again he reiterated 
the constraint, "within the framework of the law."12 In Judge 
673 (1970); Albert Tate, Jr., Introduction to JARO MAYDA, FRANCOIS GENY AND 
MODERN JURISPRUDENCE xvii (La. State Univ. Press, 1978); Albert Tate, Jr., The 
Judge's Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.U. L. REV. 
147 (1981). Judge Tate's impact on the law of Louisiana "rivaled that of Fran­
.;ois-Xa·•ier Martin and Edward Livingston, and, like them, his influence 
reached far beyond the borders of Louisiana." Warren M. Billings, Confessions 
of a Court Historian, 35 LA. HIST. 261, 261 (1994). "Indeed, William J. Brennan 
once ranked him as someone who would long be recalled for his contributions to 
modern American jurisprudence." Id. Judge Tate's extrajudicial writings have 
recently been compiled in a volume published by the Pugh Institute for Justice, 
Louisiana State University Law Center, REFLECTIONS ON LAW, LAWYERING, & 
JUDGING: THE ESSAYS & .ARTICLES OF JUSTICE ALBERT TATE, JR. (George W. 
Pugh, Jr., ed., Pugh Inst. for Justice, La. State Univ. Law Ctr., 2006), with a 
foreword by Judge James L. Dennis. 
11. See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in 
Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727, 754 (1962). Judge Tate described "the fundamen­
tal aim of the judge in deciding the case-to decide it fairly. After all, a consci­
entious judge is usually not trying to find the answer to an abstract legal co­
nundrum; he is trying to do justice, to reach a fair and reasonable solution of a 
conflict between the interests of human beings." Id. at 754. 
12. See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., the Justice Function of the Judge, 1 S.U. 
L. REV. 250, 255 (1975). Judge Tate's contribution to the historic first volume of 
the Southern University Law Review is historic itself. He rejects the "illusion" 
that judges have no justice function. Id. at 255. "This view, surely, must be 
myopic and mistaken. It overlooks the purpose supposedly animating the judi­
cial system-to accomplish justice, within (it is true) a framework of objective 
legal rule." Id. "So strong is this urge toward justice (as the judge perceives it) 
that occasionally it persuades him to adopt a solution that, at least on prima 
facie analysis, is not only unauthorized b y  legislation, but apparently contrary 
to express text. A discussion of judicial creativity would be incomplete if it did 
not touch upon this phenomenon." Albert Tate, Jr., The "New" Judicial Solu­
tion: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial Creativity, 54 TUL. L. REV. 877, 909 
(1980). In explicitly pursuing justice as an end in itself, Judge Tate built upon 
the Common Law tradition traced by Benjamin Cardozo in his Storrs Lectures 
at Yale, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), adding his own insights de­
rived from over thirty years of appellate judging in Louisiana's Civil Law sys­
tem. Judge Tate realized the advantage he had, working as a Louisiana mixed­
law judge, over his common law counterpart: "Because of the differences in 
judicial function founded upon our civilian heritage, the Louisiana mixed-law 
judge has doctrinally available to him more advantageous techniques and per­
spectiv�s than those of his common law counterpart." Albert Tate, Jr., The Role 
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Tate's own words, "[O]ur legal system requires not only that eq­
uity be reached wherever possible in individual cases; it also re­
quires some consistency and predictability of result based upon 
d 
. . ,,13 past ec1s10ns . . . . 
I shall speak only of a few civil rights suits, one of which is 
currently pending in the Supreme Court of the United States.14 I 
know civil liberties cases better than others. Sonie of them, I am 
told, require great agonizing in the conference room. 
I should add that in preparing my remarks I sought the 
help of my colleague Cheney Joseph, who unraveled Judge Tate's 
Sepulvado15 opinion for me. Some of you may know the molar 
step taken by Justice Tate for the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
1979. Remember this date, 1979. It will be important later. 
Justice Tate's opinion for the Supreme Court in State v. 
Sepulvado read Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution 
of 1974, which prohibits subjecting any person "'to cruel, exces­
sive, or unusual punishment"'-! emphasize "excessive" -as add­
ing a new constitutional dimension to state judicial review of 
criminal sentences. 16 "By it, the excessiveness of a sentence be­
comes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdic­
tion of this court,"17 said Justice Tate. 
I am sure this audience knows the word "excessive" does not 
appear in the federal Eighth Amendment.18 
Frankie Sepulvado's sentence of three and a half years at 
hard labor for carnal knowledge of a juvenile-Frankie was 
eighteen, Jamie S., fifteen and a half.-was set aside by Justice 
Tate as violative of Article I, Section 20.19 "[I]t is necessary to 
of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience, 20 LoY. L. REV. 
231, 242 (1974). Judge Tate reflected in his own work-ways the genius of Fran­
�ois Geny, fostering, with the help of Chief Justice Dixon, Justice Barham, and 
Justice Calogero, a Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana jurispru­
dence. 
(1959). 
13. Albert Tate, jr., The Judge as a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 438, 445 
14. Rankin v. McPherson, No. 85-208, October Term, 1986. 
15. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979). 
16. Id. at 764 (quoting LA. CONST. art. I, §20). 
17. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d at 764 (citing LA. CONST. art. V, §5(C)). 
18. See generally id. at 764-65 (explaining the "excessiveness" factor in 
the Eighth Amendment ). 
19. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d at 764, 773. 
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consider the context in which the illegal conduct occurred, "20 said 
Justice Tate, for whom context was always key. 
So it is for is for all great judges. 
Here is an excerpt of Justice Tate's thinking in Frankie 
Sepulvado's case: 
Without applauding the sexual permissiveness of 
the times, we can only note that in the social con­
text of the times this type of offense between young 
people is committed man y  times without criminal 
prosecution and that, in ordinary sentencing prac­
tice, it is not regarded s o  serious as to require im-
. t 21 pnsonmen . 
Surely this would sound fair to a barber in Ville Platte, 
which was Judge Tate's way of testing his opinions for the court. 
Frankie Sepulvado owes his freedom to Judge Tate, who 
himself was free to impose a new judicial duty upon his court. 
Fortunately, the law of Louisiana's Constitution of 1974, 
which he helped write, allowed Judge Tate to satisfy his sense of 
justice. It was not always this way, however. 
The law of the First Amendment also requires analysis of 
the context of Ardith McPherson's harsh words. She may owe her 
continued government employment to the sensitivity of the Fifth 
Circuit and to Judge Tate, who reversed a summary judgment 
against her. 22 McPherson was fired from her job as a deputy con­
stable for a remark she made after hearing of the attempted as­
sassination of President Reagan.23 "[l]f they go for him again, I 
hope they get him," she told a co-worker at lunch.24 The remark 
capped what McPherson, a black woman, thought was a private 
tete-a-tete expressing opposition t o  the President's policies cutting 
back on welfare and ignoring blacks.25 McPherson v. Rankin is 
one of the many public employee lawsuits requiring judges to ap-
20. Id. at 771. 
21. Id. 
22 . McPherson v. Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1984); rev'd and 
remanded by, McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), affd by, 
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
23. McPherson, 736 F.2d at 177. 
24. Id. at 177 n.2. 
25. Id. at 177. 
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ply the Pickering I Connick "balancing test": A judicial weighing 
of the First Amendment interest in protecting public employees' 
freedom of expression against the government's interest in main­
taining discipline and efficiency in the workplace.26 The case is a 
challenging civil liberties litigation that has twice hit the Fifth 
Circuit. 
The district court thought McPherson's remark unprotected 
as a matter of law, but Judge Tate identified several issues of 
material fact preventing summary judgment.27 
Constable Rankin thought that McPherson was serious; 
McPherson testified, "I didn't mean anything by it."28 Said Judge 
Tate: "The issue of McPherson's intent is relevant to the present 
inquiry because it is imperative that a court's characterization of 
speech as political expression, for purposes of First Amendment 
protection, be predicated upon consideration of its 'content, form, 
and context.'"29 
Some may say McPherson's intent is irrelevant; she said 
what she said. But the context of the speech is especially mate­
rial. If McPherson truly meant her remark as a form of political 
hyperbole, not as advocacy of harm to the President, then the 
Pickering I Connick balance would seem to weigh in her favor. 30 
At any rate, summary judgment is simply too blunt an in­
strument in these public employee, free speech cases. Balancing 
the competing interests requires a razor, not a meat axe, even in 
the face of a public employee's blunt tongue. 
On remand the district court again ruled against McPher­
son, explaining from the bench: "I'm not sure that the real ques­
tion in this case is what she meant. . . . I don't believe she meant 
nothing, as she said here today, and I don't believe that those 
words were mere political hyperbole. They were something more 
than political hyperbole. They expressed such dislike of a high 
public governmental official as to be violent words, in context."31 
26. Id. at 179. 
27. Id. at 177-78. 
28. Id. at 177 n. 3. 
29. McPherson, 736 F.2d at 178-79. 
30. See id. at 180. 
31. McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
the district court opinion). 
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In holding that McPherson's remark was not protected 
speech, the district court concluded that McPherson actually 
hoped that the President would be killed-a dubious finding of 
fact-and that, at any rate, Constable Rankin is not required to 
employ a law enforcement officer who favors political assassina­
tion-a conclusion of law hard to dispute.32 In Constable Rankin's 
colorful words, he ought not be required to employ a person who 
"rides with the cops and cheers for the robbers."33 The difficulty, 
as you might guess, is that Ardith McPherson is not a cop; all she 
does is sit at a computer all day, in a room with no phone, closed 
to the public, "enter[ing] data from court papers into a computer's ,,34 memory .... 
I wonder what Judge Tate would have done with Ardith 
McPherson's case the second time up? We will never know; it 
reached the Fifth Circuit the same month Judge Tate died. 
The second time up, McPherson's case fell into the hands of 
a younger judge, one whose intellect and judicial sensitivity seem 
to me lineal to Judge Tate's. I speak of Judge Patrick 
Higginbotham, whom you have already heard on this program, 
another of Al Tate's great admirers. His presence on the Fifth 
Circuit keeps its landscape vital. 
Judge Higginbotham reversed, 35 holding as a matter of law 
that McPherson's remark considered in its context-whether po­
litical hyperbole or an actual wish for the president's assassina­
tion-addressed a matter of public concern, and that "the value of 
protecting her right to express her opinion, however loathsome," 
outweighed the competing interest in effective and efficient law 
enforcement.36 The court agreed that a law enforcement agency 
need not employ officers who favor political assassination, but 
Judge Higginbotham cut a finer line. "The difficulty with the 
government's position," said the court, "is that McPherson's du­
ties were so utterly ministerial and her potential for undermining 
the office's mission so trivial."37 She was not a law enforcement 
officer; she had no contact with the public; she had no access to 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1237. 
35. Id. at 1235. 
36. Id. at 123 8. 
37. Id. at 1239. 
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sensitive files. In these distinct circumstances, the court held 
that McPherson could not be fired for expressing her political 
opinion.38 Here is the closing part of Judge Higginbotham's opin­
ion for the Fifth Circuit: "Political liberty will best be secured in 
the long haul," said Judge Higginbotham, "if the government tol­
erates as much diversity of opinion as its responsibilities will al­
low. Our first amendment jurisprudence is a boast that in a free 
society foolish ideas will fall of their own weight. The ideal of 
tolerance is sometimes sorely taxed in practice-when that hap­
pens, there is all the more reason to recall its long-term benefits. 
However ill-considered Ardith McPherson's opinion was, it did 
not make her unfit for her lowly job in Constable Rankin's of­
fice."39 
Surely this is sensitive writing. Whether the result is right 
and whether the Fifth Circuit's reasoning will hold up on certio­
rari remains to be seen. Ardith McPherson's case is currently in 
the crucible of the Supreme Court. 
If I were asked to predict what will happen, I would say the 
Supreme Court will reverse the Fifth Circuit. But I am confident 
that Judge Tate, from his ultimate chambers, favors a judgment 
for Ardith McPherson. So do I.4° 
The last time I saw Judge Tate alive he was in the company 
of Justice Harry A. Blackmun. There was boyish laughter be­
tween these two humble men. As fate would have it, they would 
never see each other again. 
Justice Blackmun has a vote in Ardith McPherson's case. 
He is free to favor freedom. 
One more case and I have done. What if the law and the 
judge's sense of justice conflict? What then? 
One of my students put this very question to Judge Tate. 
We had bridged the gap between our protected academic cloister 
and the Judge's chambers in New Orleans. We were there on a 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. The author's prediction was wrong, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. 
His hope, however, was fulfilled. Rankin v. M cPherson, 483 U.S. 378 ( 1987) (5-4 
decision), affg 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986). The Court affirm�d. Judge 
Higginbotham's Fifth Circuit opinion, per Justice Thurgoo� Mars�all, Jomed ?Y 
Justices Brennan, Black.mun, Powell, and Stevens. Justice Sc�ha file� a dis­
senting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist; and Justices White and 
O'Connor, joined. 
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field trip, in pursuit of a confidential chat on the judicial process. 
Judge Tate allowed me to tape record the session. I want you to 
hear his answer. Perhaps the best tribute I can pay to Judge 
Tate is to offer his own voice41 in proof that he was first and last a 
judge. 
By way of essential background, I must tell you that in a 
case called State v. James,42 Justice Tate overruled a large body of 
jurisprudence requiring the reversal and dismissal of a criminal 
prosecution where there was technical failure of the indictment to 
allege all the essential elements of the crime. No other American 
jurisdiction has such a strict rule, which makes no sense under 
modern conditions of criminal practice and procedure.43 
Second, I must tell you that State v. Jimmy Ray Malmay,44 
which is the subject of the taped conversation, was decided after 
41. Cf Paul Thompson, THE VOICE OF THE PAST, ORAL HISTORY 225-26 
(1978): 
[T]he real justification of history is not in giving an immortal­
ity to a few of the old. It is part of the way in which the living 
understand their place and part in the world .... [H]istory can 
help people see how they stand, and where they should go .... 
And in giving a past, it also helps them towards a future of 
their own making. 
42. 305 So. 2d 514 (La. 1974). 
43. In his historic contribution to the first volume of the Southern 
University Law Review, Justice Tate explained: 
This is not to say that judicially adopted policies of criminal 
procedure may not be revised when the abuse they were de­
signed to prevent is no longer a threat. For instance, until re­
cently there was an overly strict requirement of a perfect in­
dictment, which resulted in the dismissal sua sponte on appeal 
of prosecutions founded on defective indictments, even though 
the issue was not raised prior to conviction and even though 
there was no prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d 
733 (La. 1973). This could be (and was) judicially modified un­
der twentieth centµry conditions, which afford more opportu­
nity prior to trial for an accused to learn of the details of  the 
charge against him [than] in the days when the indictment 
was the only notice given to the accused of the offense charged. 
State v. James, 305 So. 2d 514 (La. 1974). 
Albert Tate, Jr., The Justice Function of the Judge 1 S.U. L. REV. 250 260 n.25 
(1975). ' ' 
44. 31 5 So. 2d 286 (La. 1975). 
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the James case, in 1975, four years before Judge Tate freed the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to review criminal sentences for exces­
siveness. 
When we were in chambers, Judge Tate couldn't remember 
the name of the case, but then it hit him-"Malmay! Jimmy Ray 
Malmay, up from Sabine, up from Many, near Many." He rushed 
over to the reports that lined his wall and, as if by magic, he 
pulled down 315 So.2d-all without looking up the citation. Ob­
viously, this case burned deeply in the Judge's memory. 
I have to add that Judge Tate's desk was so cluttered I 
didn't see the small pocket radio that was playing when I set the 
tape recorder down. The haunting music you will hear in the 
background wasn't my idea. But in this audience, I believe Judge 
Tate's voice will be heard. 
Finally, as you listen to the voice of Louisiana's Judge Tate, 
I want you to see my favorite picture of the Judge. I made a side 
trip the other day to The Times-Picayune to get it. It appeared on 
the cover of a Lagniappe feature article on Judge Tate entitled 
"Breaking Up the Bench.m5 
Carlyle in his essay on portraiture says he would give more 
for a single picture of a man, whatever it was, than for all the 
books that might be written of him. The portrait is "a small 
lighted candle by which the Biographies could for the first time 
be read, and some human interpretation made of them; the Bi­
ographied Personage . . yielding at last some features which one 
could admit to be human.''46 
[House lights down; image on screen.] 
My student asked Judge Tate to give an example of a case 
in which his sense of justice was outraged by what had happened, 
but there was nothing the Judge could do about it. Judge Tate's 
answer recalls one of the hardest things in his whole life: 
[The Voice of Judge Tate.] 
45. Claire Jupiter, Breaking Up the Bench, New Orleans States-Item 
(Lagniappe), Sept. 6, 1975, at 3. 
46. Thomas Carlyle, Exhibition of Scottish Portraits (1854), in XVI 
THE WORKS OF THOMAS CARLYLE: CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS 5 14, 515 
(Collier ed. 1897). 
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Oh, I'll give you, I'll give you the-one of the hard­
est things in my whole life. It's a case called, uh, 
State versus Jimmy, uh, State versus Jimmy Malva 
or something; he's in, probably in the penitentiary, 
poor guy. Uh, and, uh, the situation in this case 
from Sabine, up from Many, near Many. The situa­
tion in that case was [walks to wall and pulls 
down] -uh, 315 So.2d-the situation in that case 
was, we had been working hard to reform the juris­
prudence on indictments, which as you may know 
for a while was awfully, awfully technical in Lou­
isiana. It said if you left out a word negligently, 
even if you didn't raise it and had the trial, you 
could reverse 'em on appeal-I forget the line of 
cases. And we finally got rid of it. And, inciden­
tally, one of the bad things about that, in applica­
tion, it would depend upon, very often,-and this is 
one reason my good friend John Dixon might not 
have been crazy about overruling it-but in appli­
cation, if it was an absolute, terri ble injustice, 
somebody would find some little ol' indictment in­
formality and reverse, but it wasn't consistent and 
it didn't make sense, you see. So we finally got the 
thing straight. 
Now, Jimmy Ray Malmay comes up. Here's the 
situation: A kid from the wrong side of the tracks, 
uh, let's see, I think 19 years of age, uh, sold, uh, 
who gave a minister's boy in Many for a dollar a 
marijuana cigarette, for a dollar-17-year-old boy. 
Now if they had been one month less, this would 
have been about a year in the parish pen at most, 
but instead there's a fifteen-year-in-the peniten­
tiary goddam thing. And I knew the facts were so 
terrible three guys were just itching to reverse. 
And the only reversal could be on resurrecting the 
goddam worthless, ridiculous business of the in­
dictment technicality. 
And I sat there and I cried that night, I really cried 
because I knew-I didn't reverse, and I got four 
votes to affirm-but I knew I was throwing that kid 
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on the scrap heap, that everybody had thrown him 
on the scrap heap, 'cause he-he, he wasn't going to 
be a hero, he was going to be a petty thief or some­
thing-but he was not going to be a damn felon in 
the penitentiary. 
And that was the hardest thing I ever had to do in 
my life, come to think. Because I could have, I 
could have switched so easy, you know. But I 
wouldn't have been true, in my mind, to what doc­
trine was about. 
At that time, you see, we couldn't review sentences 
for excessiveness. Thank God, since '74 we'd have 
had no problem with that. 47 
[Tape off; house lights up.] 
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I will add but a word, what Holmes said in one of his com­
memorative speeches: 
When a great tree falls, we are surprised to see 
how meager the landscape seems without it. So 
when a great man dies. We may not have been in­
timate with him; it is enough that he was within 
our view; when he is gone, life seems thinner and 
less interesting. . . . We shall be fortunate enough 
if we shall have learned to look into the face of fate 
and the unknown with a smile like his.48 
Adieu, mon ami. 49 
47. Audio Tape: Confidential Chat on the Judicial Process, Chambers 
of Judge Albert Tate, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
New Orleans, Louisiana (Mar. 16, 1982) (on file in author's archives). 
48. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Sidney Bartlett (1889), in THE 
0cCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 54-
55. 
49. In recalling the voice of Louisiana's Judge Albert Tate, Jr. after 
twenty years, let us add that Judge Tate realized his own fallibility, indeed he 
acknowledged that the law is produced and a dministered by fallible human 
beings: 
But [this] ... realization[,] .. . rather than decreasing our re­
spect for the judicial process, should inspire admiration for the 
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human achievement in formulating from myriad efforts our 
great system of law. We may well be struck by the wonder and 
miracle of human intelligence and human integrity which, de­
spite the imperfections of the human agents who are the con­
stituent parts of our judicial process, produce in the majesty of 
the law a legal system whose breadth and compassion and 
fairness and intellect distills from these imperfect human con­
tributions a substance finer and fairer than could be imagined 
by any of the mortals who contributed their best thought and 
most selfless service to this end. 
Albert Tate, jr., The Judge as a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 438, 44 7 (1959). Requies­
cat in pace, cher ami. 
